BERNAMA
PUTRAJAYA, June 10 -- A total of 23 improvement proposals should be carried out as soon as possible by Prasarana Malaysia Bhd and Rapid Rail, as the owner and operator of the Light Rail Transit (LRT) system, following the collision of two trains on the Kelana Jaya line on May 24.
Transport Minister Datuk Seri Dr Wee Ka Siong said the proposals presented by the Investigation Committee regarding the collision involved five recommendations that needed to be implemented within three months, 11 proposals between three months and six months and seven improvements within more than six months.
"The (Transport) Ministry will audit the progress of these improvements periodically,” he said in a virtual media conference today to announce the findings of the Investigation Committee set up to probe into the collision.
In the 8.33 pm incident on May 24, an LRT train that had no passengers on board collided with another that was carrying 213 passengers in a tunnel between the Kampung Baru and KLCC stations.
For the short-term improvement, Wee said two hostlers (drivers) would be assigned to handle the train manually while in a tunnel, with the second hostler acting as a safety and compliance officer.
High-powered flashlights are required to be provided to the hostlers to facilitate their work while they are in a tunnel and a checklist be prepared for the use and guidance of hostlers as well as Operations Control Centres (OCCs) during manual operation and critical situations, he said.
Prasarana must also set up a Sighting Committee to perform audits on directional signs or track markers and establish a Safety Committee to report safety audits to Prasarana and Rapid Rail senior management for review and monitoring purposes, he said.
Wee said Prasarana, in between three to six months, would need to implement improvements like technical evaluation of the standard operating procedures (SOP) for manually operating trains in the tunnel along with periodic audits.
Prasarana must also carry out a technical evaluation of the communication system and present suggestions for necessary system improvements and enhance the operational SOP used at the OCCs with periodic audits, he said.
Among other improvements are reviewing SOPs related to actions in Normal (N)/Degraded (D)/Emergency (E) situations and increasing management accountability on matters related to procedures, SOPs, emergency action plans (ERP) and safety, he said.
Apart from that, he said Prasarana and Rapid Rail’s Communication Plan SOP needed to be enhanced for the understanding of all levels of employees, update the OCC and hostler rule book and manuals as well as implement Job Safety Analysis (JSA) on each staff recruitment, including existing staff in the ‘Safety Critical Position’ category for efficiency and knowledge.
Wee said the seven long-term improvements would involve periodical training and re-certification courses to maintain the efficiency of the OCC and hostler, risk assessment on the installation of stanchion in the vestibule in trains as well as simulations to test all existing and updated SOPs.
In addition, it is also necessary to conduct a study and evaluation of RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety) on the train and rail systems of Prasarana and Rapid Rail and improve the electronic train tracking system to ensure that trains can be detected from long distance in the event of a time-out, he said.
“We want Prasarana’s top management to look into this report. We want urgent attention and immediate action to ensure the safety of train operations,” he said.
Asked about the condition of the three victims being treated at the intensive care unit (ICU) of the Kuala Lumpur Hospital (HKL), Wee said they were all out of the ICU and placed in the observation ward.
All three victims, he said, are under the care of a group of HKL specialists and showing good signs of recovery,” he said.
On compensation and court action to be taken by the victims, Wee said the matter had been handed over to Prasarana and the insurance company and that every action taken by the victims would be respected.
“Everyone has a right to make a claim after an incident. That is something we have never shied away from and we will face it,” he said.
Technical problems, communication failure among cause of LRT train collision on May 24 - Wee
BERNAMA
PUTRAJAYA, June 10 -- Technical issues and communication failure between the Operations Control Centre (OCC) and the hostler (driver) are among the causes that led to the collision between two Light Rail Transit (LRT) trains on the Kelana Jaya line on May 24, said Transport Minister Datuk Seri Dr Wee Ka Siong.
He said the findings were contained in the report of the Investigation Committee set up to probe into the collision which occurred between the Kampung Baru and KLCC stations. The report was presented to the Cabinet yesterday (June 9).
In sharing the contents of the report via a virtual media conference today, Wee said the incident involved the collision between train number 40 (Train 40), with no passengers on board, that had technical problems and train number 81 (Train 81) that had 213 passengers and had departed without getting accurate confirmation.
Explaining the sequence of events regarding the incident, Wee said Train 40 experienced technical problems at 6.26 pm on the day of the crash on May 24, involving one of the two Vehicle On-Board Communication (VOBC) systems.
According to him, when one of the VOBC failed to function and lost communication with the OCC, then the train had to be emptied of passengers at the next station and taken out of service for maintenance at the Lembah Subang depot via the Automatic Train Operation (ATO) control while the second VOBC was still functioning.
However, the second VOBC on Train 40 also failed to function at 8.13 pm while on its way to Lembah Subang and was stranded between the KLCC and Kampung Baru stations.
“The OCC could not control Train 40 when both its VOBC malfunctioned. As such, the hostler was ordered to manually drive Train 40 to go to the nearest station, namely Dang Wangi, in order to be reset into the ATO mode,” he said.
Wee said that investigations found that during the process of driving the train to be reset into the ATO mode, both the hostler and OCC officer (controller) had ignored certain critical standard operating procedures (SOP) and this inadvertently resulted in Train 40 being inadvertently being moved northbound to Gombak instead of southbound to the depot.
At the same time, he said Train 81 was being held back at the KLCC station and placed under the Manual Route Reservation (MRR) status, which is protection for Train 40 before it can be operated via ATO.
“However, Train 81 was released to depart the KLCC station heading towards the Kampung Baru station without getting an accurate confirmation that said Train 40 had been reset to ATO. This situation then led to the collision between Train 40 and Train 81,” he said.
Wee said the hostler’s action was unintentional because, at that time, the information regarding the track section number was insufficient, whereby periodic reporting to the OCC should have taken place.
He stressed that the objective of the investigation was to determine the actual situation and cause of the collision with the aim of preventing a recurrence as well as improving public transport services and not intended to prove the guilt or liability against any party.
Meanwhile, Transport Ministry secretary-general Datuk Isham Ishak, who led the Investigating Committee, said the findings revealed that the maintenance conducted by Prasarana was in order and according to the manuals.
He said there was no discrepancy or anomaly in the maintenance of the trains but the SOP was not completely adhered to as there should have been a checklist to avoid such incidents.
"The VOBC failure doesn't happen every day, it seldom happens. But when it happens, there must be an SOP which everyone understands and follows on how to handle manual train," he said.
